

# **Leveraging Peer Effects: The Effect of Community-based Programs on the Adoption of Solar Panels**

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# Peer-to-Peer Marketing is an Established Idea



“You need to meet people in the communities where they live, work and play.”

- Briane Keane  
President of SmartPower



# This Strategy Works for Energy Too

- Energy demand is sensitive to reported energy use of neighbors (Allcott 2011)
- Peer effects have been shown to have a significant effect on patterns of solar diffusion (Bollinger and Gillingham 2012)



# Clustering of Installations

Most solar installations fall within 200 meters of each other.  
(Fairfield, CT)








# Solarize CT




- Single competitively selected installer
- Tiered group pricing
- Volunteer-driven 20-week outreach campaign
- Partnership between city governments, SmartPower, and the CT Clean Energy Finance and Investment Authority



# The Solarize CT Towns



## Cumulative Solar Growth in Solarize CT Towns



# Descriptive Evidence of Success

- All Solarize CT towns so far have at least doubled their total number of residential solar PV systems
  - Maximum percent increase in total number of systems was 504%
  - Average percent increase among Phase 1 towns was 282%
- \$200k of funding leveraged over \$2.2 million in savings on solar PV (CEFIA 2013)
- On average, homeowners saved at least 24% on the per-watt cost of solar (CEFIA 2013)
- 20% of those who installed through Phase 1 said they had never previously considered solar (CEFIA 2013)

# Motivation for Our Study

- Quantify the treatment effect of the Solarize program
  - Isolate this effect from self-selection bias
- Examine the relationship between demographics and the adoption of solar PV



# Data

- Solar installation data since 2004 courtesy of the Connecticut Clean Energy Finance and Investment Authority (CEFIA)
- Demographic data taken from U.S. Decennial Census and 5-Year American Community Survey estimates
- Demographic data are interpolated quadratically to generate a 2004-2013 annual data set

# Methods

Create a “synthetic control group” for our Solarize towns:

- Propensity score is generated using a logit function

$$P(y=1 | \mathbf{x}) = e^{(\beta_0 + \mathbf{x}\beta)} / [1 + e^{(\beta_0 + \mathbf{x}\beta)}]$$

$y$  = binary indicator for Solarize towns

$\mathbf{x}$  is a vector of demographic variables

- Each Census block group in a Solarize town is matched to the three non-Solarize block groups with the closest propensity scores.

# Methods

- Difference-in-differences analysis with fixed effects:

$$Y_{mt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 s_m + \beta_2 T_t + \beta_3 (s_m * T_t) + \beta_i \mathbf{X}_{mt} + \mu_m + \delta_t + e_{mt}$$

$Y$  = number of solar contracts signed in a given block group in a given month

$m$  = market, i.e. a single block group

$t$  = time; month for installation data and year for demographic data

$s$  = a binary indicator variable for whether the block group was in a Solarize town

$T$  = a binary indicator variable for whether the month fell within the time period of the Solarize campaign


$\mathbf{X}$  = a vector of demographic variables

$\mu$  = block group fixed effects

$\delta$  = month fixed effects

# The Bridgeport Anomaly

**A Comparison of Average Demographics**



# Phase-specific Regression Results

	(1) PSM	(2) PSM caliper	(3) CEC controls
Phase 1 During	0.574*** (0.122)	0.575*** (0.122)	0.562*** (0.122)
Phase 1 Post	0.120*** (0.0318)	0.121*** (0.0317)	0.108*** (0.0281)
Phase 2 During	0.576*** (0.101)	0.578*** (0.101)	0.537*** (0.0997)
Phase 2 Post	0.387*** (0.106)	0.385*** (0.106)	0.335** (0.104)
Adjusted R-squared	0.139	0.139	0.086

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Demographic controls included average household income, median age, size of housing stock, percentage of whites in the population, percent of houses that are owner-occupied, and percentage of the population that is registered democratic. The only control that had any significance was percentage of whites at 1-5%. Bridgeport is excluded from this analysis.



# Pooled Solarize Regression Results

	(1) PSM	(2) PSM caliper	(3) CEC controls
Solarize during	0.577*** (0.0850)	0.579*** (0.0850)	0.553*** (0.0830)
Solarize post	0.135*** (0.0397)	0.136*** (0.0397)	0.124*** (0.0283)
Adjusted R-squared	0.138	0.138	0.085
Standard errors in parentheses			
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			



Demographic controls included average income, median age, size of housing stock, percentage of whites in the population, percent of houses that are owner-occupied, and percentage of the population that is registered democratic. The only control that had any significance was percentage of whites at 1-5%. Bridgeport is excluded from this analysis.


# Conclusions

- Participating in Solarize CT increases installations by about 0.6 installations per block group per month during the five-month-campaign.
  - This translates to on average 44 additional installations due to the program over the full campaign.
- Solarize CT appears to continue to boost solar growth after the campaign ends.
- Solarize campaigns are a complement to more traditional, individual-focused subsidies.

# Next Steps

- Investigate the potential applicability of the Solarize model to other clean energy technologies
- Further examine the cost-effectiveness of the Solarize model
- Conduct similar analyses on the results of the Solarize Mass program

# Solarize Mass



Thanks to the US DOE Sunshot Initiative for funding this study...  
and THANK YOU for your interest!





# Pooled Solarize Regression Results Including Bridgeport

	(1) PSM	(2) PSM caliper	(3) CEC controls
Solarize during	0.577*** (0.0850)	0.579*** (0.0850)	0.553*** (0.0830)
Solarize post	0.135*** (0.0397)	0.136*** (0.0397)	0.124*** (0.0283)
% White	0.00101 (0.000513)	0.00103* (0.000515)	0.000613** (0.000221)
Adjusted R-squared	0.138	0.138	0.085

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Demographic controls are average household income, median age, size of housing stock, percentage of whites in the population, percent of houses that are owner-occupied, and percentage of the population that is registered democratic. Percent white is the only control with any significance.